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Abstract—We propose a secure and efficient implementation
of fungible tokens on Bitcoin. Our technique is based on a
small extension of the Bitcoin script language, which allows the
spending conditions in a transaction to depend on the neighbour
transactions. We show that our implementation is computation-
ally sound: that is, adversaries can make tokens diverge from
their ideal functionality only with negligible probability.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, tokens, neighbourhood covenants
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main applications of blockchain technologies
is the exchange of custom crypto-assets, called tokens. Token
transfers currently involve ∼ 50% of the transactions on the
Ethereum blockchain [1], and they are at the basis of many
protocols built on top of that platform [2], [3]. Broadly, tokens
are classified as fungible or non-fungible. Fungible tokens can
be split into smaller units: different units of the same token can
be used interchangeably. Further, users can join units of the
same fungible token, and exchange them with other crypto-
assets. Instead, non-fungible tokens cannot be split or joined.
Historically, the first implementations of tokens were de-
veloped before Ethereum, on top of Bitcoin. Some of them
(e.g., [4]) used small bitcoin fractions to represent the token
value; some others (e.g., [5]–[7]) embedded the token value in
other transaction fields [8], to cope with the fluctuating bitcoin
price. All these implementations have a common drawback:
the correctness of the token actions is not guaranteed by the
consensus protocol of the blockchain. In fact, the blockchain
is used just to notarize the actions that manipulate tokens,
but not to check that these actions are actually permitted.
Typically, the owners of these tokens must resort to off-chain
mechanisms (e.g., trusted authorities) to have some guarantees
on the correct use of tokens, e.g. that they are not double-spent,
or that distinct tokens are not joined.
By contrast, modern blockchain platforms support on-chain
tokens, whose correctness is guaranteed by the consensus pro-
tocol of the blockchain. Some platforms (e.g., Algorand [9])
natively support tokens, while some others (e.g., Ethereum)
encode them as smart contracts. Bitcoin, instead, does not
support tokens natively, and its limited script language is
not expressive enough to implement them as smart contracts.
Since adding native tokens to Bitcoin appears to be out of
reach, given the resilience of the Bitcoin community to radical
changes [10], the only viable alternative is to devise a small,
efficient extension of the script language which increases the
expressiveness of Bitcoin enough to support tokens.
A recent Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP 119 [11], [12])
aims at extending the Bitcoin script language with covenants, a
class of operators that allow a transaction to constrain how its
funds can be used by the redeeming transactions. Although
these covenants enable a variety of use cases, e.g. vaults,
batched payments, and non-interactive payment channels [11],
they are not expressive enough to implement fungible tokens
in a practical way. Roughly, the covenants proposed in the
literature can check that the token units are preserved upon
split actions, but they cannot ensure this property upon join
actions (we describe these and other issues in Section II).
In this work, we propose a variant of covenants, named
neighbourhood covenants, which can inspect not only the
redeeming transaction, but also the siblings and the parent of
the spent one. This extension preserves the basic UTXO design
of Bitcoin, adding only a few opcodes to its script language,
which is kept efficient, loop-free, and non Turing-complete.
Still, neighbourhood covenants significantly increase the ex-
pressiveness of Bitcoin as a smart contracts platform, allowing
to execute arbitrary smart contracts by appending a chain
of transactions to the blockchain. Technically, we prove that
neighbourhood covenants make Bitcoin Turing-complete.
Although this expressiveness result is of theoretical interest,
in itself it does not enable an efficient implementation of
tokens. To recover efficiency, we implement token actions
in a single, succinct script which exploits neighbourhood
covenants. We devote a large portion of the paper to establish
the security of our construction: in brief, we define a symbolic
model of token actions, and a computational model, where
performing these actions corresponds to appending transac-
tions to the Bitcoin blockchain. Our main technical result is
a computational soundness theorem, which ensures that any
execution in the computational model has a corresponding
execution in the symbolic one. Therefore, we guarantees that a
computational adversary cannot make the behaviour of tokens
diverge from the behaviour of the symbolic model.
Contributions: We summarise our contributions as follows:
• we introduce a symbolic model of fungible tokens, which
formalises their archetypal features: their minting and
burning, the split and join operations, and the exchange
of tokens with other tokens or with bitcoins (Section III);
• we propose neighbourhood covenants as a Bitcoin exten-
sion (Section V), and we show that they make Bitcoin
Turing-powerful (Theorem 2). We then discuss how to
efficiently implement them on Bitcoin;
• we exploit neighbourhood covenants to implement tokens
on Bitcoin (Section VI);
• we introduce a computational model for Bitcoin and
we prove the computational soundness of our token
implementation (Theorem 5 in Section VII);
• as an consequence, we show that a value preservation
property established in the symbolic model can be lifted
for free to the computational model (Theorem 6).
The proofs of our results are in the Appendix.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
In this section we summarize our approach: in particular, we
sketch our implementation of Bitcoin tokens, motivating the
use of neighbourhood covenants to guarantee their security.
Tokens: We propose a symbolic model of fungible tokens.
Since non-fungible tokens are the special case of fungible ones
where each token is generated exactly in one unit, hereafter
we consider the general case of fungible tokens. The basic
element of our model is the deposit, i.e. a term of the form:
〈A, v : τ 〉x (v ∈ N)
which represents the fact that a user A owns v units of a
token τ , where τ may denote either user-defined tokens or
bitcoins (B). The index x uniquely identifies the term within
a configuration, i.e. a composition of deposits, e.g.:
〈A, 1 : τ 〉x | 〈A, 2 : τ 〉y | 〈B, 3 : B〉z
We define a few actions to mint and manipulate tokens. First,
any user A can mint v units of a new token, spending a deposit
of 0 B. Performing this action (say, with v = 10) is modelled
as a state transition, whose labels records the performed action:
〈A, 0 : B〉x0
gen
−−→ 〈A, 10 : τ 〉x1 (1)
where the identifier x1 of the new deposit and the identifier τ
of the minted token are fresh. After performing the action, A
owns a deposit of ten units of the token τ . As said before, one
of the peculiar properties of fungible tokens is that they can
be split . When splitting her deposit in two smaller deposits,
A can choose the owner of one of the new deposits, e.g.:
〈A, 10 : τ 〉x1
split
−−−→ 〈A, 8 : τ 〉x2 | 〈B, 2 : τ 〉x3 (2)
A user can transfer the ownership of any of her deposits to
another user. For instance, A can give her deposit x2 to B:
〈A, 8 : τ 〉x2
give
−−−→ 〈B, 8 : τ 〉x4 (3)
After that, B owns a total of 10 units of τ in two separate
deposits, one with 8 units, and the other one with 2 units.
This reflects the UTXO nature of Bitcoin: by contrast, in
account-based blockchains like Ethereum, B would have a
single account storing 10 units of τ . Now, B can join his two
deposits, obtaining a single deposit with 10 units of τ . When
performing the join action, B can also choose the owner of
the new deposit, in this case transferring it back to A:
〈B, 8 : τ 〉x4 | 〈B, 2 : τ 〉x3
join
−−→ 〈A, 10 : τ 〉x5 (4)
A crucial property of the join operation is that only deposits
of the same token can be joined together. Thus, two deposits
of τ and τ ′ with τ 6= τ ′ cannot be joined:
〈B, 8 : τ 〉x4 | 〈A, 2 : τ
′〉x6 6
join
−−→
In this configuration, if both A and B agree, they can
exchange the ownership of their tokens:
〈B, 8 : τ 〉x4 | 〈A, 2 : τ
′〉x6
xchg
−−−→ 〈A, 8 : τ 〉x7 | 〈B, 2 : τ
′〉x8
The xchg operation also supports the exchange between
bitcoins and other tokens, representing the trade of tokens.
For instance, A can buy 2 units of τ ′ from B for 1B:
〈B, 2 : τ ′〉x8 | 〈A, 1 : B〉x9
xchg
−−−→ 〈A, 2 : τ ′〉x10 | 〈B, 1 : B〉x11
Bitcoin: Although Bitcoin does not support user-defined
tokens, it implements all the operations discussed above on
its native crypto-currency. Intuitively, each deposit corresponds
to a transaction output, and performing actions corresponds to
appending a suitable transaction that redeems it.
For instance, minting bitcoins is obtained through coinbase
transactions, which are used in Bitcoin to pay rewards to
miners. We represent a coinbase transaction as follows:
T1
in(1): ⊥
wit(1): ⊥
out(1): {scr : versig(pkA , rtx.wit), val : 10B}
In general, the in field points to a previous transaction on
the blockchain, that the current one is trying to spend. Here,
the “undefined” value ⊥ characterizes T1 as a coinbase, since
it mints bitcoins without spending any transaction. The out
field is a record, where scr is a script, and val is the amount
of bitcoins that will be redeemed by a subsequent transaction
which points to T1 and satisfies its script. Here, the script
versig(pkA , rtx.wit) verifies a signature on the redeeming
transaction (rtx, excluding its wit field) against A’s public key
pkA . This signature is retrieved from the wit field of rtx. Since
A is the only user who can redeem T1, we can say that T1
is the computational counterpart of the deposit 〈A, 10 : B〉x1 .
To perform the split action (2) on τ = B, we can spend T1
with a transaction T2 with two outputs:
T2
in(1): (T1, 1)
wit(1): sigskA (T1)
out(1): {scr : versig(pkA , rtx.wit), val : 8B}
out(2): {scr : versig(pkB , rtx.wit), val : 2B}
The first output, that we denote by (T2, 1), corresponds
to the deposit 〈A, 8 : B〉x2 in (2). Instead, the output (T2, 2)
corresponds to 〈B, 2 : B〉x3 . These outputs can be spent in-
dependently. For instance, performing the give action in (3)
corresponds to appending a transaction which spends (T2, 1):
T3
in(1): (T2, 1)
wit(1): sigskA (T3)
out(1): {scr : versig(pkB , rtx.wit), val : 8B}
At this point, we have two unspent outputs on the
blockchain: (T2, 2) and (T3, 1). We can perform the join
action in (4) by spending both of them simultaneously with
the following transaction, which has two inputs:
T4
in(1): (T2, 2) in(2): (T3, 1)
wit(1): sigskB (T4) wit(2): sigskB (T4)
out: {scr : versig(pkB , rtx.wit), val : 10B}
Implementing Bitcoin tokens with covenants: Although
the Bitcoin script language is a bit more flexible than shown
above, it does not allow to implement on-chain tokens. One of
the first techniques to embed on-chain tokens in an extended
version of Bitcoin was described in [13]. The technique relies
on covenants, an extension of Bitcoin scripts which allows
transactions to constrain the scripts of the redeeming ones.
Roughly, a transaction output containing the script:
e and verrec(rtxo(n))
where e is an arbitrary script, can only be redeemed by a
transaction which makes e evaluate to true, and whose script in
the n-th output is syntactically equal to e and verrec(rtxo(n)).
Using covenants, we can mint a token by appending the
transaction T below, where the extra field arg is syntactic sugar
for a sequence of values accessible by the script:
T
· · ·
out(1): {arg : pkA ,
scr : versig(ctxo.arg, rtx.wit) and // verify signature
rtxo(1).val = 1 and // preserve value
verrec(rtxo(1)), // preserve script
val : 1B}
The arg field identifies A as the owner of the token: to
transfer the ownership to B, A must spend T with a transaction
T′, setting its arg to B’s public key. For this to be possible, T′
must satisfy the conditions specified in T’s script: (i) the wit
field must contain the signature of the current owner; (ii) the
output at index 1 must have 1B value, to preserve the value of
the token; (iii) the script at index 1 in T′ must be equal to that
in T. Once T′ is on the blockchain, B can transfer the token
to another user, by appending a transaction which redeems T′.
Note that the transaction T above actually mints a non-
fungible token, which can be transferred from one user to
another, but whose value cannot be split (further, the token
has a subtle flaw related to join actions: we will say more on
this). The first step to turn the token into a fungible one is
to support the split action. We can achieve this by adding a
second element to the arg sequence, to represent the number
of token units deposited in the transaction output. Using the
notation w.i to access the i-th element of a sequence w (for
1 ≤ i ≤ |w|), we can implement a splittable token as follows:
T4
· · ·
out(1):{arg :pkB 8S, scr : e, · · · }
out(2): · · ·
T3
· · ·
out(1):{arg : pkB 2S, scr : e, · · · }
out(2): · · ·
T5
in(1): (T4, 1) in(2): (T3, 1)
out(1): {arg : pkA 10 J, scr : e, val : · · · }
Fig. 1: A transaction T5 attempting to join T4 and T3.
Tsplit
· · ·
out(1): {arg : pkA v,
scr : versig(ctxo.arg.1, rtx.wit) and
rtxo(1).arg.2 + rtxo(2).arg.2 = ctxo.arg.2 and
verrec(rtxo(1)) and verrec(rtxo(2)) and
outlen(rtx) = 2
val : · · · }
The last two lines of the script ensure that any transaction
which redeems Tsplit has exactly two outputs, each one with
the same script of Tsplit . The second line ensures that the split
preserves the number of token units (here, val is immaterial).
Now, let esplit be the script used in Tsplit . To extend the
token with the join action, first we need to add a third element
to the arg sequence, to encode the action performed by a
transaction (say, G for gen , S for split , and J for join ). The
extended script could have the following form:
e , if rtxo(1).arg.3 = S then esplit else ejoin
where ejoin implements the join functionality, i.e.: (i) verify
the signature on the redeeming transaction; (ii) check that
the redeeming transaction has exactly two inputs and one
output; (iii) ensure that the token units are preserved; (iv)
ensure that the joined transactions represent units of the same
token.
For instance, consider the transactions in Figure 1, where
T4 and T3 represent, respectively, the deposits 〈B, 8 : τ 〉x4
and 〈B, 2 : τ 〉x3 . To perform the join action in (4), we must
spend T4 and T3 with the transaction T5: this requires to
satisfy the script e in T4 and T3. For condition (iii), the script
must ensure that the 10 token units redeemed by T5 are the
sum of the 8 units in T4 and the 2 units in T3. For condition
(iv), the script in T4 should check that it is the same as that
in T3, and viceversa. Hence, to implement conditions (iii)-
(iv), the script in a transaction output must be able to access
the fields in its sibling, i.e. the transaction output which is
redeemed together (e.g., (T3, 1) is the sibling of (T4, 1) when
appending T5). However, neither Bitcoin nor its extensions
with covenants [12]–[15] allow scripts to access the siblings.
An insecure implementation of join: To implement the
join action, we start by extending Bitcoin scripts with an
operator to access the sibling transaction outputs:
stxo(n) , output redeemed by the n-th input of rtx
TA
· · ·
out(1): {arg :pkA 10G,
scr : e, val : · · · }
TM
· · ·
out(1): {arg :pkM 10G,
scr : e, val : · · · }
T1
in(1): (TA , 1)
out(1): {arg :pkA 8S,
scr : e, val : · · · }
out(2): · · ·
T2
in(1): (TM , 1)
out(1): {arg :pkA 7S,
scr : e, val : · · · }
out(2): · · ·
T3
in(1): (T1, 1) in(2): (T2, 1)
out(1): {arg :pkA 15 J, scr : e, val : · · · }
Fig. 2: A join attack merging two different tokens.
Using this new operator, we can encode the conditions (iii)
and (iv) in ejoin as follows:
rtxo(1).arg.2 = stxo(1).arg.2 + stxo(2).arg.2 (iii)
verrec(stxo(1)) and verrec(stxo(2)) (iv)
Although this implementation of ejoin correctly encodes the
conditions, it introduces a security vulnerability: an adversary
can join two deposits of different tokens. The attack is exem-
plified in Figure 2. The transactions TA and TM mint 10 units
of different tokens, and transaction T3 joins them into a single
deposit of the same token. Ideally, to counter this attack, ejoin
should check not only the sibling, but also its ancestors until
the minting transaction, and verify that it corresponds to the
minting ancestor of the current transaction output. Although
this would be possible by adding script operators that can go
up the transaction graph at an arbitrary depth, this would be
highly inefficient from the point of view of miners, who should
record the whole transaction graph, instead of just the set of
unspent transactions (UTXO).
Neighbourhood covenants: To address this issue, we use
an operator which can go up the transaction graph only
one level, i.e. up to the parent of the current transaction.
Hence, implementing our Bitcoin extension with neighbour-
hood covenants requires miners to just record the UTXOs
and their parents. By exploiting this new covenant, we can
thwart the join attack of Figure 2, and eventually obtain a
secure and efficient implementation of fungible tokens. We
now sketch the script eTOK which implements tokens. First,
we add a fourth element to the arg sequence, to record in
each transaction output the identifier of the token deposited
in that output. As an identifier, we use the hash of the parent
of the minting transaction, which we access through the script
txid(ptxo(1)). When we evaluate the script contained in the
minting transaction (e.g., TA and TM in Figure 2), we require
that its arg field actually contains the token identifier:
egen , · · · and ctxo.arg.4 = txid(ptxo(1))
Then, in the sub-scripts corresponding to all other token
actions, we check that the redeeming transaction preserves the
TA
in(1): (T′
A
, 1)
out(1): {arg :pkA 10GH(T′A, 1),
scr : eTOK , val : · · · }
TM
in(1): (T′
M
, 1)
out(1): {arg :pkM 10GH(T′M , 1),
scr : eTOK , val : · · · }
T1
in(1): (TA , 1)
out(1): {arg : pkA 8SH(T′A , 1),
scr : eTOK , val : · · · }
out(2): · · ·
T2
in(1): (TM , 1)
out(1): {arg : pkA 7SH(T′M , 1),
scr : eTOK , val : · · · }
out(2): · · ·
T3
in(1): (T1, 1) in(2): (T2, 1)
out(1): {arg :pkA 15 J tokid, scr : eTOK , val : · · · }
Fig. 3: Thwarting the join attack.
token identifier. E.g., in the join sub-script, besides checking
conditions (iii) and (iv) as shown before, we add the condition:
ejoin , · · · and ctxo.arg.4 = rtxo(1).arg.4
In Figure 3 we show how this resolves the attack of Figure 2.
In order to append the malicious join transaction T3, we must
satisfy the script eTOK in both T1 and T2. These scripts check
that the tokid in the redeeming transaction T3 is equal to the
identifiers of the two branches, H(T′
A
, 1) and H(T′
M
, 1): by
collision resistance of the hash function, this is not possible.
The discussion above shows how to counter an attack which
attempts to join different tokens. However, the adversary could
devise more ingenious attacks, e.g. forging units of an existing
token. For instance, if TM in Figure 3 were storing B, its
owner could spend it to create a transaction T2 with arbitrary
scripts and arguments. In particular, T2 could use eTOK
and any token identifier in arg.4, e.g., H(T′
A
, 1), effectively
forging new units of a pre-existing token. Our full eTOK script
exploits neighbourhood covenants to prevent these kinds of
attacks as well (see e.g. the discussion before Lemma 4).
III. A SYMBOLIC MODEL OF TOKENS
Let A,B, . . . range over users, and let τ , τ ′ , . . . range over
tokens, encompassing both user-defined ones and bitcoins (B).
A term 〈A, v : τ 〉x represents a deposit of v ∈ N units of the
token τ owned by A (the index x is an unique identifier of
the deposit). A term A ⊲x α represents A’s authorization to
perform the action α on the deposit x. The possible token
actions are the following:
• gen(x, v) represents the act of spending a bitcoin deposit
x to mint v units of a new token. The owner of these units
is the user who owned the deposit x.
• burn(x, y) represents the act of destroying a sequence of
deposits x, moving them to an unspendable deposit y.
• split(x, v,B) represents the act of splitting a deposit x
(say, containing v+v′ units of a token τ ) in two deposits
of τ . The first one of these deposits is owned by the same
owner of x, and contains v token units. The second one
if owned by B, and contains the remaining v′ units.
• join(x, y,C) represents the joining of two deposits x and
y of the same token, into a new deposit, owned by C.
• xchg(x, y) represents the act of atomically exchanging
the owners of the two deposits x and y (not both of
bitcoins). In particular, when one of the deposits stores B,
this action represents buying/selling tokens for bitcoins.
• give(x,B) represents a donation of the deposit x to B.
Users follow a common pattern to perform token actions:
(i) first, the involved users grant their authorization on the
action; (ii) once all the needed authorizations have been
granted, the action can actually be performed.
A configuration Γ is a compositions of deposits and autho-
rizations. We assume that configurations form a commutative
monoid under the composition operator |, and we use 0 to
denote the empty configuration. We require that if 〈A, v : τ 〉x
and 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉x′ both occur in Γ, then x 6= x′. We define
a transition semantics between configurations in Figure 4.
Transitions are decorated with labels, which describe the per-
formed actions. The rules for granting authorizations (Figure 8
in Appendix A) are straightforward.
Rule [GEN] consumes a bitcoin deposit x owned by A to
generate v units of a new token τ , which are stored in a fresh
deposit y. Note that A’s authorization is required to perform
the action. For simplicity, we assume that minting tokens has
no cost: it would be straightforward to adapt the rule to require
a minting fee. Rule [BURN] removes from the configuration a
single token deposit (when n = 1 and τ1 6= B), or atomically
removes a sequence of bitcoin deposits (when τ i = B for all i).
Rule [SPLIT] divides a deposit x in two fresh deposits y and z,
preserving the number of token units. Rule [JOIN] allows A and
B to merge two deposits of a token τ , preserving the amount
of token units, and transferring the new deposit to C. Rule
[XCHG] allows A and B to swap two deposits, containing either
user-defined tokens or bitcoins. Finally, rule [GIVE] allows A to
donate one of her deposits to another user.
The transition relation −→ is non-deterministic, because of
the fresh names generated for deposits and tokens: however,
given a transition Γ
α
−→ Γ′ the label α is uniquely determined
from Γ and Γ′. A symbolic run S is a (possibly infinite)
sequence Γ0Γ1 · · · , where Γ0 contains only B deposits, and for
all i ≥ 0 there exists some (unique) αi such that Γi
αi−→ Γi+1.
For all i ≥ 0, we denote with Si the i-th element of the run,
when this element exists. If S is finite, we denote its length
as |S|, and we write ΓS for its last configuration, i.e. S|S|−1.
Definition 1 (Token balance). We define the balance of a token
τ 6= B in a configuration Γ inductively as follows:
balτ (0) = 0 bal τ (Γ | Γ
′) = balτ (Γ) + balτ (Γ
′)
balτ (〈A, v : τ 〉x) = v bal τ (〈A, v : τ
′〉x) = 0 (τ
′ 6= τ )
The following lemma establishes a basic preservation prop-
erty: the balance of a token after a run is equal to the minted
value minus the burnt value, defined as:
mintedτ (S) = v if ∃i :
Si
gen(x,v)
−−−−−→ Si+1, and
τ occurs in Si+1 but not in Si
burntτ (S) =
∑{
v
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃i : Si
burn(x,y)
−−−−−−→ Si+1, and
Si = Γ | 〈A, v : τ 〉x
}
Lemma 1. Let S be a finite symbolic run. For all τ 6= B:
bal τ (S) = mintedτ (S)− burntτ (S)
IV. BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS
In this section we recall the functionality of Bitcoin. To
this purpose we rely on the formal model of [16], simplifying
or omitting the parts that are irrelevant for our subsequent
technical development (e.g., we abstract from the fact that, in
the Bitcoin blockchain, transactions are grouped into blocks).
Transactions: Following the formalization in [16], we rep-
resent transactions as records with the following fields:1.
• in is the list of inputs. Each of these inputs is a transaction
output (T, i), referring to the i-th output field of T.
• wit is the list of witnesses, of the same length as in.
Intuitively, for each (T, i) in the in field, the witness at
the same index must make the i-th output script of T
evaluate to true.
• out is the list of outputs. Each output is a record of the
form {scr : e, val : v}, where e is a script, and v ≥ 0.
We let f range over transaction fields, and we denote with
T.f the content of field f of transaction T. We write T.f(i)
for the i-th element of the sequence T.f, when in range;
when the sequence has exactly one element, we write T.f
for T.f(1). For transaction outputs (T, i), we interchangeably
use the notation (T, i) and T.out(i), and we use the notation
above to access their sub-fields scr and val. When clear
from the context, we just write the name A of a user in
place of her public/private keys, e.g. we write versig(A, e)
for versig(pkA , e), and sigA(T) for sigskA (T).
Scripts: Bitcoin scripts are terms with the following syntax:
e ::= v constant (integer or bitstring)
| e ◦ e operators (◦ ∈ {+,−,=, <})
| if e then e else e conditional
| e.n n-th element of sequence e (n ∈ N)
| rtx.wit witnesses of the redeeming tx
| |e| size (number of bytes)
| H(e) hash
| versig(e, e ′) signature verification
Besides constants v, basic arithmetic/logical operators, and
conditionals, scripts can access the elements of a sequence
(e.n), and the sequence of witnesses of the redeeming trans-
action (rtx.wit); further, they can compute the size |e| of a
bitstring and its hash H(e). The script versig(e, e ′) evaluates
to 1 if the signature resulting from the evaluation of e ′ is
verified against the public key resulting from the evaluation
of e, and 0 otherwise.2 For all signatures, the signed message
is the redeeming transaction (except its witnesses).
1Bitcoin transactions can also impose time constraints on when they can
be appended to the blockchain, or when they can be redeemed. Since time
constraints are immaterial for our technical development, we omit them.
2Multi-signature verification is supported by Bitcoin scripts, but immaterial
for our technical development: therefore, we omit it.
Γ = A ⊲x gen(x, v) | Γ
′ v > 0 y, τ fresh
〈A, 0 : B〉x | Γ
gen(x,v)
−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉y | Γ′
[GEN]
Γ =
(
‖ i∈1..n Ai ⊲xi burn(x1 · · ·xn, y)
)
| Γ′ n = 1 ∨ (n ≥ 1 ∧ ∀i : τ i = B)
(
‖ i∈1..n〈Ai, vi : τ i〉xi
)
| Γ
burn(x1···xn,y)
−−−−−−−−−−→ Γ′
[BURN]
Γ = A ⊲x split(x, v,B) | Γ
′ v, v′ ≥ 0 y, y′ fresh
〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉x | Γ
split(x,v,B)
−−−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉y | 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y′ | Γ′
[SPLIT]
Γ = A ⊲x join(x, y,C) | B ⊲y join(x, y,C) | Γ
′ z fresh
〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y | Γ
join(x,y,C)
−−−−−−−→ 〈C, (v + v′) : τ 〉z | Γ′
[JOIN]
Γ = A ⊲x xchg(x, y) | B ⊲y xchg(x, y) | Γ
′ τ 6= B x′, y′ fresh
〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉y | Γ
xchg(x,y)
−−−−−−→ 〈A, v′ : τ ′〉x′ | 〈B, v : τ 〉y′ | Γ′
[XCHG]
Γ = A ⊲x give(x,B) | Γ
′ y fresh
〈A, v : τ 〉x | Γ
give(x,B)
−−−−−−→ 〈B, v : τ 〉y | Γ′
[GIVE]
Fig. 4: Semantics of token actions.
The semantics of scripts is in Figure 5. The script
evaluation function J·KT,i takes two additional parameters:
T is the redeeming transaction, and i is the index of the
redeeming input/witness. The result of the semantics can be
an integer, a bitstring, or a sequence of integers/bitstrings.
We denote with H a public hash function, with size(v) the
size (in bytes) of an integer v, and with ver a signature
verification function (the definition of these semantic
operators is standard, see e.g. [16]). The semantics of a
script can be undefined, e.g. when accessing an element
of a non-sequence: we denote this case as ⊥. All the
operators are strict i.e. they evaluate to ⊥ if some of their
operands is ⊥. We use standard syntactic sugar for scripts, e.g.:
(i) false , 0, (ii) true , 1, (iii) e and e ′ , if e then e ′ else false , (iv) e or e ′ , if e then true else e ′ ,
and finally (v) not e , if e then false else true.
Blockchains: A blockchain B is a finite sequence T0 · · ·Tn,
where T0 is the only coinbase transaction (i.e., T0.in = ⊥).
We say that the transaction output (Ti, j) is spent in B iff
there exists some Ti′ in B (with i
′ > i) and some j′ such
that Ti′ .in(j
′) = (Ti, j). The unspent transaction outputs of
B, written UTXO(B), is the set of transaction outputs (Ti, j)
which are unspent in B. A transaction T is a valid extension
of B = T0 · · ·Tn whenever the following conditions hold:
1) for each input i of T, if T.in(i) = (T′, j) then:
• T′ = Th, for some h < n (i.e., T
′ is in B);
• the output (T′, j) is not spent in B;
• J(T′, j).scrKT,i = v 6= 0;
2) the sum of the amounts of the inputs of T is greater or
equal to the sum of the amount of its outputs.
The Bitcoin consensus protocol ensures that each transac-
tion Ti in the blockchain is valid with respect to the sequence
of past transactions T0 · · ·Ti−1. The difference between the
amount of inputs and that of outputs of transactions is the fee
paid to miners who participate in the consensus protocol.
V. NEIGHBOURHOOD COVENANTS
To extend Bitcoin with neighbourhood covenants, we amend
the model of pure Bitcoin in the previous section as follows:
• in transactions, we add a field to outputs, making them
records of the form {arg : a, scr : e, val : v}, where a is
a sequence of values; Intuitively, this extra element can
be used to encode a state within transactions;
• in scripts, we add operators to access all the outputs of
the redeeming transaction, and a relevant subset of those
of the sibling and parent transactions (by contrast, pure
Bitcoin scripts can only access the redeeming transaction,
and only as a whole, to verify it against a signature);
• in scripts, we add operators for covenants.
We now formalize our Bitcoin extension. We use o to refer
to the following transaction outputs:
o ::= rtxo(e) output of the redeeming tx
| stxo(e) output of a sibling tx
| ptxo(e) output of a parent tx
More precisely, consider the case where a transaction output
(T′, j) is redeemed by a transaction T, through its i-th input.
When used within the script of (T′, j): rtxo(n) refers to the
n-th output of T; stxo(n) refers to the output redeemed by
the n-th input of T; ptxo(n) refers to the output redeemed by
the n-th input of T′. In Figure 6, we exemplify these outputs
in relation to the transaction Tc. The semantics of o is defined
in the first line of Figure 7; its result is a pair (T, n).
We extend scripts as follows, where f ∈ {arg, val}:
e ::= · · · | o.f field of a tx output
| verscr(e, o) basic covenant
| verrec(o) recursive covenant
| inidx index of redeeming tx input
| outidx index of redeemed tx output
| inlen(o) number of inputs
| outlen(o) number of outputs
| txid(o) hash of (tx,output)
The script o.f gives access to the field f of a transaction
output o (where f is either arg or val). The basic covenant
verscr(e, o) checks that the script in the transaction output o
is syntactically equal to e (note that e is not evaluated). The
“recursive” covenant verrec(o) checks that the script in o is
syntactically equal to script which is currently being evaluated.
The operators inidx and outidx evaluate, respectively, to the
index of the redeeming input and redeemed output. We call
current transaction output (ctxo) the transaction output which
includes the script which is currently being evaluated, i.e.:
ctxo , stxo(inidx)
JvKT,i = v Je ◦ e
′KT,i = JeKT,i ◦⊥ Je
′KT,i Jif e0 then e1 else e2KT,i = if Je0KT,i then Je1KT,i else Je2KT,i
Je.nKT,i = vn if JeKT,i = v1 · · · vk (1 ≤ n ≤ k) Jrtx.witKT,i = T.wit(i)
J|e|KT,i = size(JeKT,i) JH(e)KT,i = H(JeKT,i) Jversig(e, e
′)KT,i = verJeKT,i(Je
′KT,i,T, i)
Fig. 5: Semantics of Bitcoin scripts.
Tp
in: · · ·
out(1): {arg : np, · · · } // ptxo(1)
T′p
in: · · ·
out(1): {· · · } // ptxo(2)
Tc
in: (Tp, 1) (T
′
p , 1)
out(1): {
arg: nc
scr: ctxo.arg = nc
and ptxo(1).arg = np
and rtxo(3).arg = nr
and stxo(2).arg = ns
}
Ts
in: · · ·
out(1): {arg : ns, · · · } // stxo(2)
out(2): {· · · } // not accessible
Tr
in: (Tc, 1) (Ts, 1)
out(1): · · · // rtxo(1)
out(2): · · · // rtxo(2)
out(3): {arg : nr, · · · } // rtxo(3)
Fig. 6: Accessing transaction outputs through a script.
The scripts inlen(o) and outlen(o) evaluate, respectively, to
the number of inputs and to the number of outputs of the
transaction containing o. Finally, txid(o) evaluates to a unique
identifier of the transaction output o.
Example 1. Consider the transactions in Figure 6. The script
in Tc.out(1) checks that (i) the arg field of ctxo, i.e. the same
output which contains the script, equals to nc; (ii) the arg
field of ptxo(1), i.e. the parent transaction output redeemed
by Tc.in(1), equals to np; (iii) the arg field of rtxo(3), i.e.
the third output of the redeeming transaction Tr, equals to
nr; (iv) the arg field of stxo(2), i.e. the sibling transaction
output redeemed by Tr.in(2), equals to ns. Note that, in
general, any script used in Tc can not access the parents of Tp
and those of Ts — and in general all the transactions which
are farther than those shown in the figure. ⋄
Figure 7 defines the semantics of extended scripts. As
in Section IV, the function J·K takes as parameters the re-
deeming transaction T and the index i of the redeeming input.
We denote with ≡ syntactic equality between two scripts, i.e.
e ≡ e ′ is 1 when e and e ′ are exactly the same, 0 otherwise.
Turing completeness: Our neighbourhood covenants make
Bitcoin Turing-complete. To prove this, we describe how to
simulate in the extended Bitcoin any counter machine [17], a
well-known Turing-complete computational model. A counter
machine is a pair (n, s), where n ∈ N is the number of integer
registers of the machine, and s is a sequence of instructions.
Instructions are the following: inc i increments register i,
dec i decrements it, zero i sets it to zero, if i 6= 0 goto j
conditionally jumps to instruction j when register i is not zero,
halt terminates the machine. The state of a counter machine
(n, s) is a tuple (v1, . . . , vn, p) where each vi represents the
current value of register i, and p is the number of the next
instruction to execute (i.e., the program counter). To exploit the
currency transfer capabilities of Bitcoin, we slightly extend the
counter machine model, by requiring that the machine has an
initial B balance which, upon termination, is transferred to the
user A if the content of the first register is 0, or to B otherwise.
We call this extended model UTXO-counter machine.
Theorem 2. Neighbourhood covenants can simulate any
UTXO-counter machine. Hence, they are Turing-complete.
Proof. (sketch) We represent the state of the counter machine
as a single transaction having one output. We simulate an
execution step by appending a new transaction, which redeems
the output representing the old state, and transfers its balance
to a new output representing the new state. This is done until
the machine halts, at which point we transfer its balance to the
user determined by the final registers state. We remark that this
simulation is made possible by the use of unbounded integers
in our model, while Bitcoin only supports 32-bit integers.
We represent the machine state in the arg field of the
transaction output o, storing it as a sequence of integers. As a
shorthand, we write o.ri for o.arg.i, and o.p for o.arg.(n+1).
To simulate the execution steps of the machine, we define the
script eCM , which checks that the new transaction T indeed
represents the next state. More in detail, we first check whether
the instruction in s at position ctxo.p is halt, in which case we
require that T distributes the balance to users in the intended
manner, depending on the current state. When ctxo.p points to
any other instruction, we start by requiring that T has only one
output, the same balance, and the same script. We use a recur-
sive covenant verrec on the redeeming transaction to ensure
the last part. Then, we check that the new state in T.out(1).arg
agrees with the counter machine semantics, by cases on the
instruction pointed to by o.p. If the instruction is inc i, then we
require rtxo(1).ri = ctxo.ri + 1, rtxo(1).rk = ctxo.rk for all
k 6= i, and rtxo(1).p = ctxo.p+1. The dec i and zero i cases
are analogous. For the instruction if i 6= 0 goto j, we check
the value of ctxo.ri: if nonzero, we require that rtxo(1).p = j,
otherwise that rtxo(1).p = ctxo.p+1. In both cases, we require
that rtxo(1).rk = ctxo.rk for all k.
Users start the simulation by appending to the blockchain a
transaction T0 having one output with the desired value, the
script eCM , and a sequence of n+ 1 zeros as arg. After that,
the balance is effectively locked inside the transaction, and the
only way to transfer it back to the users is to simulate all the
steps of the machine, until it halts. So, our simulated execution
is a form of secure multiparty computation [18]–[20].
Although, for simplicity, we use UTXO-counter machines
Jrtxo(e)KT,i = (T, JeKT,i) Jstxo(e)KT,i = T.in(JeKT,i) Jptxo(e)KT,i = T
′.in(JeKT,i) if T.in(i) = (T
′, j)
Jo.fKT,i = JoKT,i.f Jverscr(o, e)KT,i = e ≡ JoKT,i.scr Jverrec(o)KT,i = T.in(i).scr ≡ JoKT,i.scr Jtxid(o)KT,i = H(JoKT,i)
JoutidxKT,i = j if T.in(i) = (T, j) JinidxKT,i = i Joutlen(o)KT,i = |T
′.out| Jinlen(o)KT,i = |T
′.in| if JoKT,i = (T
′, j)
Fig. 7: Semantics of neighbourhood covenants (extending Figure 5).
just to transfer funds to A or B upon termination, it would
be easy to generalise the computational model and simulation
technique to encompass interactive computations, which at
run-time can receive inputs and perform currency transfers.
Doing so, we can execute arbitrary smart contracts, with
the same expressiveness of Turing-complete smart contracts
platforms. In principle, we could craft a smart contract which
implements user-defined tokens in an account-based fashion:
this contract would record the balance of the tokens of all
users, and execute token actions. However, in practice this
construction would be highly inefficient: performing a single
token transfer would require to append a large number of
transactions, and to pay the related fees.
To improve the efficiency of tokens, instead of limiting to
covenants on the redeeming transaction, as in the simulation
above, we could also use covenants on the parent and sibling
transactions. In Section VI we show an efficient implementa-
tion of tokens, which fully exploits neighbourhood covenants.
Implementing neighbourhood covenants: To extend Bit-
coin with neighborhood covenants, only small changes to the
script language are needed. Currently, scripts can only access
the redeeming transaction, and only for signature verification.
To enable covenants, scripts need to access the fields of the
redeeming transaction, and those of the parent and the sibling
transaction outputs. First, the UTXO data structure must be
extended to record the parents of unspent outputs. Full nodes
could simply access these transactions from their identifiers.
Lightweight nodes, i.e. Bitcoin clients with limited resources
that store the UTXO instead of the whole blockchain, must
also store parents beside the UTXO; when all the children of
a transaction are spent, the parent can be deleted.
To implement the covenants verrec and verscr, the Bitcoin
script language must be extended with new opcodes. A former
covenant-enabling opcode is the CheckOutputVerify of [13],
which uses placeholders to represent variable parts of the
script (e.g., versig(<pubKey >, rtx.wit)). However, its imple-
mentation requires string substitutions at run-time to insert the
wanted values in the script before checking script equality.
Instead, our neighbourhood covenants can be implemented
more efficiently. In our covenants, we can use exactly the
same script along a chain of transactions, relying on the
arg sequence to record state updates. The script can access
the state through the operator o.arg, which require suitable
opcodes. Since the script is fixed, nodes do not have to
perform string substitutions, and checking script equality can
be efficiently performed by comparing their hashes.
Adding the arg field to outputs does not require to alter the
structure of pure Bitcoin transactions. Indeed, the arg values
can be stored at the beginning of the script as push operations
on the alternative stack, and copied to the main stack when the
script refers to them, using the same technique used in [21].
When hashing the scripts for comparison, we discard these
arg values: this just requires to skip the prefix of the script
comprising all the push to the alternative stack.
VI. IMPLEMENTING TOKENS IN BITCOIN
In this section we show how to implement token actions in
Bitcoin. To this purpose, we define a computational model,
which describes the interactions of users who exchange mes-
sages and append transactions to the Bitcoin blockchain. A
computational run C is a sequence of bitstrings γ, each of
which encodes one of the following actions: (i) A → ∗ : m,
denoting the broadcast of a bitstringm; (ii) T, denoting the ap-
pending of a transaction T to the blockchain. A computational
run always starts from a coinbase transaction T0. By extracting
the transactions from a run C, we obtain a blockchain BC .
We relate the computational and the symbolic models
through a relation between symbolic runs S and computational
runs C: intuitively, S is coherent with C when each step in S is
simulated by a step in C. In the rest of this section we provide
the main intuition about the coherence relation, postponing the
full details to Appendix B. The coherence relation, denoted
as ∼ , is parameterized over two injective functions txout and
tkid which track, respectively, the names x and the tokens τ
occurring in ΓS , mapping them to transaction outputs (T, i),
where T occurs in C. We abbreviate S ∼txout,tkid C as S ∼ C.
We simulate each symbolic token action in Figure 4 by
appending a suitable transaction to the blockchain. We use
the arg part of transaction outputs to record the token data:
1. op is the action implemented by the transaction: 0 = gen ,
1 = burn , 2 = split , 3 = join , 4 = xchg , 5 = give;
2. owner is the (public key of the) user who owns of the
token units controlled by the tx output;
3. tkval is the number of units controlled by the tx output;
4. tkid is the unique token identifier.
We implement the token actions as a single script eTOK ,
which uses a switch on the op value to jump to the first
instruction of the requested action. Since the script is quite
complex, we present independently the parts corresponding to
each action, postponing the complete script to Appendix B
(Figure 9). All the transactions implementing token actions
use exactly the same script, which we preserve throughout ex-
ecutions by using recursive covenants. To improve readability,
we refer to the elements of the arg sequence by name rather
than by index, e.g. we write o.op rather than o.arg.1.
Gen: We implement the gen action by the following script:
1 if not verrec ( ptxo (1)) // ctxo is a gen
2 then ctxo. tkid = txid( ptxo (1)) // token id
3 and ptxo (1). val = 0 // spent txo has 0 BTC
4 and outlen ( ctxo) = 1 // gen has 1 out
5 and ctxo . tkval > 0 // positive token val
6 else ... // the other branches must preserve token id
Recall that gen produces a symbolic step of the form:
〈A, 0 : B〉x
gen(x,v)
−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉y (v > 0)
To translate this symbolic action into a computational one, we
must spend a transaction output corresponding to 〈A, 0 : B〉x ,
and produce a fresh output corresponding to 〈A, v : τ 〉y .
Assuming that the deposit x corresponds to an unspent trans-
action output (T′, 1) on the blockchain, this requires to append
a transaction T redeeming (T′, 1), and ensuring that:
1) the parent transaction output (T′, 1) is not a token deposit,
but just a plain B deposit (line 1);
2) tkid is the identifier of the parent tx output (line 2).
This corresponds to identifying the fresh name τ with
the deposit name x of the redeemed B deposit;
3) 0B are redeemed from the parent transaction (line 3);
4) T has exactly one output (line 4);
5) tkval is positive (line 5), corresponding to the constraint
v > 0 in the symbolic semantics.
Notice that the first time the script is evaluated is when
redeeming T (not when appending it). At that time, ctxo
will evaluate to (T, 1), and ptxo(1) to (T′, 1). The script
ensures that, when T is redeemed, its tkid will contain a
unique identifier of the token. Crucially, the scripts which
implement the other token actions will preserve this identifier
in the tkid parameter. This identifier is essential to guarantee
the correctness of the join and xchg actions.
Burn: We implement the burn action by the script:
1 versig( ctxo . owner ,rtx. wit) and // check owner
2 verscr( false , rtxo (1)) and // make rtx unspendable
3 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 1 and // rtx has 1 in
4 outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 out
Recall that burn produces a symbolic step:
(
‖ i∈1..n〈Ai, vi : τ i〉xi
) burn(x1···xn,y)
−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
There are two cases, according to whether we are burning a
single token deposit, or one or more B deposits. In the first
case, assuming that the computational counterpart of x1 is
the output (T′, 1), the corresponding computational step is to
append a transaction T redeeming (T′, 1). The witness of T
must carry a signature of the owner A, and its output script
is false , making it unspendable. In the second case, it suffices
to append a transaction T which redeems all the transaction
outputs corresponding to x1, . . . , xn, and has a false script.
Split: We implement the split action by the script:
1 versig( ctxo. owner ,rtx. wit) // check owner
2 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // covenants on rtx
3 and verrec ( rtxo (2))
4 and inlen( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 in
5 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 outs
6 and rtxo (1). tkval >= 0 // positive token value
7 and rtxo (2). tkval >= 0
8 and rtxo (1). owner = ctxo. owner // preserve owner
9 and rtxo (1). tkid = ctxo. tkid // preserve tkid
10 and rtxo (2). tkid = ctxo. tkid
11 and rtxo (1). tkval + rtxo (2). tkval = ctxo. tkval
Recall that split produces a symbolic step of the form:
〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉x
split(x,v,B)
−−−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉y | 〈B, v
′ : τ 〉z
Assuming that x corresponds to an unspent transaction
output (T′, 1), performing this step in Bitcoin requires to
append a transaction T redeeming (T′, 1), and ensuring that:
1) the witness of T carries a signature of the owner (line 1);
2) T has only one input and two outputs, both containing
the same script of (T′, 1) (line 2-5);
3) the tkval of T’outputs rtxo(1) and rtxo(2) are≥ 0 (line 6-
7), corresponding to the precondition v, v′ ≥ 0 in [SPLIT];
4) tkid of T’s outputs is the same of (T′, 1) (line 9-10);
5) the sum of token values tkval of the outputs of T′ is equal
to the token value of (T′, 1) (line-11).
Join: We implement the join action by the script:
1 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 ins
2 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 out
3 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // coventant on rtx
4 and verrec ( stxo (2)) // covenants on both inputs
5 and verrec ( stxo (1))
6 and ctxo. tkid = rtxo (1). tkid // preserve token id
7 and versig( ctxo . owner , rtx. wit) // check sig of owner
8 and rtxo (1). tkval = stxo (1). tkval + stxo (2). tkval
Recall that join produces a symbolic step of the form:
〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v
′ : τ 〉y
join(x,y,C)
−−−−−−−→ 〈C, (v + v′) : τ 〉z
Assume that x and y correspond to the unspent transaction
outputs (T′, 1) and (T′′, 1). To perform the corresponding
computational step we append a transaction T redeeming
(T′, 1) and (T′′, 1), and ensuring that, for both inputs:
1) T has two inputs and one output, containing the same
script of (T′, 1) and (T′′, 1) (line 1-5);
2) the token identifier tkid of the output of T′ (rtxo(1)) is
the same of (T′, 1) (line 6);
3) the witness of T carries a signature of the owner (line 7);
4) the sum of token values tkval of both inputs is equal to
the token value of (T, 1) (line 8).
Note that the script in (T′, 1) ensures that the one in (T′′, 1)
is the same, and vice-versa. In this way, we prevent joining
tokens with bitcoins. To also prevent joining tokens of different
type, the script checks that the tkid of the current transaction
is the same as the one of the first output of the redeeming
transaction. This is done by both inputs. In other words,
stxo(1).tkid = rtxo(1).tkid and stxo(2).tkid = rtxo(1).tkid,
implying that stxo(1).tkid = stxo(2).tkid.
Exchange: We implement the xchg action by the script:
1 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 ins
2 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 outs
3 and verrec ( stxo (1)) // covenant on input 1
4 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // covenant on rtx(1)
5 and versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit) // check owner
6 and rtxo (1). owner = stxo (2). owner // exchange owner
7 and rtxo (2). owner = stxo (1). owner
8 and rtxo (1). tkval = stxo (1). tkval // preserve value
9 and rtxo (1). tkid = stxo (1). tkid // preserve tkid
10 if verrec ( stxo (2)) then // exchange token/token
11 verrec ( rtxo (2)) // covenant on rtx(2)
12 and rtxo (2). tkval = stxo (2). tkval // preserve tkval
13 and rtxo (2). tkid = stxo (2).tkid // preserve tkid
14 else // exchange token/BTC
15 verscr( versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit), rtxo (2))
16 and rtxo (2). val = stxo (2). val // preserve BTC
Recall that the symbolic xchg step has the form:
〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v
′ : τ ′〉y
xchg(x,y)
−−−−−−→ 〈A, v′ : τ ′ 〉x′ | 〈B, v : τ 〉y′
where τ must be a token, while τ ′ is either a B or a token.
Assume that x and y correspond to the unspent transaction
outputs (T′, 1) and (T′′, 1). To perform the corresponding
computational step we append a transaction T redeeming
(T′, 1) and (T′′, 1), and ensuring that, for both inputs:
1) T has two inputs and two output (lines 1-2);
2) the first input and the first output of T must contain the
same script of (T′, 1) and (T′′, 1) (lines 3-4);
3) the witness of T carries a signature of the owner (line 5);
4) the owner in the first output of T (rtxo(1)) must be equal
to the owner in the second input (T′′, 1) (line 6);
5) dually, the owner in the second output of T (rtxo(2)) must
be equal to the owner in the first input (T′, 1) (line 7);
6) the token value and identifier of the first output of T
(rtxo(1)) must be equal to those of (T′, 1) (line 8-9).
Furthermore, if verrec(stxo(2)) is true, i.e. we are exchanging
a token with a token. In this case, we require that:
1) the second output of T must contain the same script of
(T′, 1) and (T′′, 1) (line 11);
2) the token value and identifier of the second output of T
(rtxo(2)) must be equal to those of (T′′, 1) (line 12-13);
When exchanging a token with a B deposit, we require:
1) the script of the second output of T (rtxo(2)) to be
versig(ctxo.owner, rtx.wit) (line 15);
2) the value of the second output of T to be equal to the
value of (T′′, 1) (line 16).
Give: We implement the give action by the script:
1 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 in
2 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 out
3 and versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit) // check owner
4 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // covenant on rtx(1)
5 and rtxo (1). tkid = ctxo. tkid // preserve tkid
6 and rtxo (1). tkval = ctxo. tkval // preserve value
Recall that give produces a symbolic step of the form:
〈A, v : τ 〉x
give(x,B)
−−−−−−→ 〈B, v : τ 〉y
Assuming that x corresponds to an unspent transaction output
(T′, 1), performing this step in Bitcoin requires to append a
transaction T redeeming (T′, 1), and ensuring that:
1) T has only one input and one output (lines 1-2);
2) the witness of T carries a signature of the owner (line 3);
3) the output of T (rtxo(1)) contains the same script of
(T′, 1) (line 4);
4) the token value and identifier of the first output of T
(rtxo(1)) is the same of those of (T′, 1) (lines 5-6).
Authorizations: Symbolic authorization steps (see Figure 8
in Appendix A) correspond to computational broadcasts of
signatures. Computational users, however, can also broadcast
other messages: in particular, adversaries can broadcast any
arbitrary bitstring they can compute in PPTIME. Coherence
discards any broadcast which does not correspond to any of
the symbolic steps above, i.e., such broadcasts correspond
to no symbolic steps. Discarding these messages does not
affect the security of tokens, because the other computational
messages (i.e., transactions and their signatures) are enough
to reconstruct the symbolic run from the computational one.
Other transactions: A subtle case of coherence is that of
transactions appended by dishonest users. To illustrate the is-
sue, suppose that some dishonest A1 · · ·An own some bitcoins,
represented in the symbolic run as deposits 〈Ai, vi : B〉xi for
i ∈ 1..n, and in the computational run as transaction outputs
Tx1 · · ·Txn , each one redeemable with Ai’s private key. The
dishonest users can sign an arbitrary T′ which redeems all
the Tx1 · · ·Txn , and append it to the blockchain. Crucially,
T′ may not correspond to gen , split , join , xchg or give
actions. In this case, to obtain coherence, we simulate the
appending of T′ with a (previously authorized) burn of the
deposits 〈Ai, vi : B〉xi . In subsequent steps, coherence will
ignore the descendants of T′ in the computational run, since
in general they cannot be represented symbolically. More
precisely, appending a transaction where none of the inputs
corresponds to a symbolic deposit results in no symbolic
action. The case of a deposit 〈A, v : τ 〉x with a user-generated
token τ is similar: appending T′ is simulated by a symbolic
burn, and T′ is not represented symbolically. In all cases,
a transaction which spends a symbolically-represented input
must be represented symbolically, otherwise coherence is lost.
Efficiency of the implementation: To estimate the effi-
ciency of the implementation, we consider the number of
cryptographic operations, as their execution cost is an order
of magnitude greater than the other operations. In particular,
performing verrec and verscr requires to compute the hash of
a script (once this is done, the cost of comparing two hashes is
negligible). This cost can be reduced by incentivizing nodes
to cache scripts. The most expensive token action is xchg ,
which, having two inputs, needs to verify 2 signatures and
execute at most 10 covenants operations, which overall require
to compute at most 6 script hashes. If nodes cache scripts,
the cost of the action is not dissimilar to the one required to
append a standard transaction with two inputs.
Note that, even though eTOK is a non-standard script, it
could be used in a standard P2SH transaction, as in [21],
if it did not exceed the 520-bytes limit. Taproot [22] would
mitigate this issue: for scripts with multiple disjoint branches,
Taproot allows the witness of the redeeming transaction to
reveal just the needed branch. Therefore, the 520-bytes limit
would apply to branches instead of the whole script.
VII. COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS
An immediate consequence of the definition of coherence
is the following lemma, which ensures that unspent deposits
in a symbolic run S have a corresponding unspent transaction
output in any computational run C coherent with S.
Lemma 3. Let S ∼ C. For each deposit 〈A, v : τ 〉x in ΓS ,
there exists a distinct tx output txout(x) in UTXO(BC)
storing v : τ , and spendable through a signature of A.
Lemma 4 is a sort of dual of Lemma 3, describing how
to relate computational token deposits to symbolic ones. In
general, this is complex since a computational adversary can
craft arbitrary scripts which are not representable in the sym-
bolic model: hence, the blockchain can contain transactions T
which do not correspond to any symbolic deposit. A tricky
case is when, after some token τ is minted in the symbolic
world, a computational adversary creates a descendent T′ of
T with the token script and tkid = τ , effectively forging new
units of τ . Note that such forgery can not be prevented, since
the adversary can create transactions with arbitrary outputs.
However, such forged tokens are useless: this is guaranteed
by Lemma 4, which shows that T′ is unspendable.
Lemma 4. Let S ∼ C. Let (T, i) be a tx output in UTXO(BC)
storing v : τ , with τ 6= B. If (T, i).tkid does not correspond to
any tx output in BC , then (T, i) is unspendable. Otherwise, if
(T, i).tkid occurs in BC , and (T, i).tkid is equal to txout(x)
for some x such that gen(x, v′) is fired in S, then:
1) if (T, i) 6∈ ran (txout) then (T, i) is unspendable;
2) if (T, i) = txout(y) for some y, then (T, i) is spendable,
and 〈A, v : τ 〉y occurs in ΓS , where A = (T, i).owner.
Note that all the results above require as hypothesis that
S ∼ C. In the rest of this section we show that, with over-
whelming probability, for each computational run C there
exists a symbolic run S which is coherent with C. Actually, our
computational soundness result is more precise than that. First,
we consider only a subset Hon of users to be honest, while we
consider all the others dishonest: without loss of generality,
we model them as a single adversary Adv. We assume that
both honest users and the adversary have a strategy, which
allows them to decide the next actions, according to the past
run. Our computational soundness result establishes that, with
overwhelming probability, any computational run conforming
to the (computational) strategies has a corresponding symbolic
run conforming to the corresponding (symbolic) strategies.
Consequently, if there exists an attack at the computational
level, then the attack is also observable at the symbolic level.
Symbolic strategies: The strategy Σs
A
of a honest user A is
a PTIME algorithm which allows A to select which action(s)
to perform, among those permitted by the token semantics.
Σs
A
receives as input a finite symbolic run S, and outputs a
finite set of enabled actions, with the constraint that Σs
A
cannot
output authorizations for B 6= A. We require strategies to be
persistent: if on a run Σs
A
chooses an action α, and α is not
taken as the next step in the run (e.g., because some other
user acts earlier), then Σs
A
must still choose α after that step,
if still enabled. The adversary Adv acts on behalf of all the
dishonest users, and controls the scheduling among all users
(including the honest ones). Her symbolic strategy Σs
Adv
is
a PTIME algorithm taking as input the current run and the
sets of moves outputted by the strategies of honest users. The
output of Σs
Adv
is a single action α (to be appended to the
current run). To rule out authorization forgeries, we require
that if α is an authorization by some honest A, then it must
be chosen by Σs
A
. Fixing a set of strategies Σs — both for
the honest users and for the adversary — we obtain a unique
run, which is made by the sequence of actions chosen by Σs
Adv
when taking as input the outputs of the honest users’ strategies.
We say that this run is conformant to Σs . When Σs
Adv
6∈ Σs ,
we say that S conforms to Σs when there exists some Σs
Adv
such that S conforms to Σs ∪ {Σs
Adv
}.
Computational strategies: A computational strategy Σc
A
for a honest user A is a PPTIME algorithm which receives
as input a computational run C, and outputs a finite set
of computational labels. The choice among these labels is
controlled by Adv’s strategy, specified below. We assume that
each user knows her private key, and the public keys of all the
other users. We impose a few sanity constraints: (i) we forbid
A to impersonate another user; (ii) if the strategy outputs a
transaction T, then T must be a valid update of the blockchain
BC obtained from the run in input, and all the witnesses of T
have already been broadcast in the run; (iii) finally, strategies
must be persistent, similarly to the symbolic case. Adv’s
computational strategy Σc
Adv
is a PPTIME algorithm taking
as input a run C and the moves chosen by each honest user.
The strategy gives as output a single computational label, to
be appended to the run. We assume that Adv can impersonate
any other user. Given a symbolic strategy Σs
A
, we can obtain
a computational strategy Σc
A
= ℵ(Σs
A
) by implementing the
symbolic actions as the corresponding computational ones
(this can be done using the same technique in [23]). Given
a set of computational strategies Σc — both for the honest
users and for the adversary — we probabilistically generate
a conformant computational run, made by the sequence of
actions chosen by Σc
Adv
when taking as input the outputs of
the honest users’ strategies.
Computational soundness: We are now ready to establish
our main result. We assume that cryptographic primitives are
secure, i.e., hashes are collision resistant and signatures cannot
be forged (except with negligible probability).
Theorem 5. Let Σs be a set of symbolic strategies for
all A ∈ Hon. Let Σc be a set of computational strategies
such that Σc
A
= ℵ(Σs
A
) for all A ∈ Hon, and including
an arbitrary adversary strategy Σc
Adv
. For each k ∈ N and
security parameter η, we define the following experiment:
1) generate C conforming to Σc , with |C| ≤ ηk;
2) if there exists S conforming to Σs such that S ∼ C then
return 1, otherwise return 0.
Then, the experiment returns 1 with overwhelming probability
w.r.t. the security parameter η.
As an application of our results, we lift the balance preserva-
tion result of Lemma 1 from the symbolic to the computational
model. We start by defining the balance of a computational
token. Then, in Theorem 6 we establish the equivalence
between symbolic token balance and the computational one.
Definition 2 (Balance of a computational token). For all
computational runs C and transaction outputs t, let:
Pt =
{
t′
∣∣∣ t′ ∈ UTXO(BC) and t′ is spendable and
t′.tkid = t and t′.scr = eTOK
}
We define the balance of the computational token t in C as:
bal t(C) =
∑
t′∈Pt
t′.tkval
Theorem 6. Let S ∼ C. If gen(x, v) is fired in S, generating
a fresh token τ , then:
balτ (S) = bal txout(x)(C)
Proof. We first prove that balτ (S) ≤ bal txout(x)(C). For each
〈A, v : τ 〉y in ΓS , by Lemma 3 there exists a distinct spendable
(T, i) = txout(y) in UTXO(BC) such that (T, i).owner =
A, (T, i).scr = eTOK , (T, i).tkval = v, and (T, i).tkid =
txout(x). Then, (T, i) ∈ Ptxout(x), and so v contributes to
bal txout(x)(C). We now prove that balτ (S) ≥ bal txout(x)(C).
Let t ∈ Ptxout(x). Since t ∈ UTXO(BC) and it is spendable,
by item 2 of Lemma 4 some deposit 〈A, v : τ 〉 occurs in ΓS ,
with A = t.owner. Then, v contributes to balτ (C).
VIII. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a secure and efficient implementation
of fungible tokens on Bitcoin, exploiting neighbourhood
covenants, a powerful yet simple extension of the Bitcoin
script language. The security of our construction is established
as a computational soundness result (Theorem 5). This guaran-
tees that adversaries at the Bitcoin level cannot make tokens
diverge from the ideal behaviour specified by the symbolic
token semantics, unless with negligible probability.
To keep the presentation simple, we have slightly limited
the functionality of tokens, making split/join/exchange actions
operate on just two deposits, and omitting time constraints.
Lifting these restrictions would only affect the size, but not the
complexity, of our technical development. Further, it would
allow to use tokens as is within high-level languages for
Bitcoin contracts, e.g. BitML [23], [24], simplifying the design
of financial contracts which manage tokens. For instance, we
could model as follows a basic zero-coupon bond [25] where
an investor A pays upfront to a bank B 5 units of a token τ ,
and receives back 1B after a maturity date t:
split(5:τ → withdraw B | 1:B→ after t : withdraw A)
A research question arising from our work is how to exploit
neighbourhood covenants in the design of high-level languages
for Bitcoin contracts. Besides enhancing the expressiveness of
these languages (e.g., by allowing for unbounded recursion),
neighbourhood covenants would enable a simpler compila-
tion technique, compared e.g. that used in BitML. Indeed,
to guarantee the liveness of contracts, BitML requires the
participants in a contract to pre-exchange their signatures
on all the transactions obtained by the compiler. By using
covenants, we could avoid this overhead, since the logic which
controls that a contract action is permitted is not based on
signatures, but is implemented by the covenant.
Related work: In Ethereum, similarly to our approach,
tokens are implemented on top of the platform using a smart
contract, following the ERC-20 and ERC-712 standards [26],
[27]. An alternative approach is to provide a native support
for tokens: the works [28], [29] follow this approach, propos-
ing an extension of the UTXO model used in the Cardano
blockchain [30]. The work [31] also proposes an extension of
the UTXO model that supports native tokens. Unlike the pre-
vious approaches, in this model there is no privileged crypto-
currency: transaction fees are paid in the same currency which
is being exchanged. Algorand [9] supports native tokens in an
account-based model, allowing their minting, burn, transfer,
and their exchange through atomic groups of transactions.
The first proposals of covenants in Bitcoin date back at
least to 2013 [32]. Nevertheless, their inclusion into the
official Bitcoin protocol is still uncertain, mainly because of
the cautious approach of the Bitcoin community to accept
extensions [10]. The emerging of Bitcoin layer-2 protocols
like the Lightning Network [33] has revived the interest in
covenants, as witnessed by a recent Bitcoin Improvement
Proposal (BIP 119 [11]). Currently, covenants are supported
by Bitcoin Cash [34], a mainstream blockchain platform
originated from a fork of Bitcoin.
The work [13] proposes a new opcode CheckOutputVerify to
explicitly constrain the outputs of the redeeming transaction,
while [15] implements covenants by extending the current im-
plementation of versig with a new opcode CheckSigFromStack,
which can check a signature on arbitrary data on the stack.
Both [13] and [15] can constrain the script of the redeeming
transaction to contain the same covenant of the spent one,
enabling recursive covenants similarly to our verrec(rtxo(n)).
An alternative approach is to implement covenants without
adding new opcodes. This approach is proposed by [12], which
relies on modified signature verification scheme, allowing
users to sign a transaction template, i.e. to sign only parts
of a transaction, leaving the state parameters variable. The
idea that covenants would allow to implement state machines
on Bitcoin was first made by [15]: in Theorem 2 we show
that, using our neighbourhood covenants, Bitcoin can actually
simulate counter machines, assuming unbounded integers.
The work [35] describes an approach to extend the UTXO
model with a variant of covenants which, similarly to ours,
can access the redeeming and the sibling transactions. Besides
this, the extension in [35] features registers, loops, complex
data structures, and native tokens, making it quite distant from
an implementation on Bitcon. Compared to [35], our extension
devises a minimal extension to the UTXO model, so to allow
for an efficient implementation on Bitcoin, and support secure
fungible tokens.
The work [14] introduces a formal model of covenants,
which can be implemented in Bitcoin with modifications
similar to the ones discussed in Section V. However, since the
covenants in [14] only constrain the redeeming transaction,
their implementation is simpler, since it does not require to
extend the UTXO set with the parents. As a downside, the
covenants of [14] do not allow to implement fungible tokens.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR SECTION III
Proof of Lemma 1
By induction on S, and by case analysis on each step.
Inspecting each symbolic semantics rule, we can see that each
step preserves the amount of token units, except for minting
([GEN]) and burning ([BURN]), which are explicitly taken into
account by the equation.
APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR SECTION VI
We now formalize the coherence relation between symbolic
and computational runs sketched in Section VII. Below, we
call eTOK the token script in Figure 9, and as eBTC the script:
versig(ctxo.owner, rtx.wit)
We inductively define the relation:
coher (S, C, txout, tkid , txburn)
where:
• S is a symbolic run;
• C is a computational run;
• txout is an injective function, mapping the names x
occurring in ΓS (except those only in authorizations) to
unspent transaction outputs (T, i) (where T occurs in C);
• tkid is an injective function, mapping the tokens τ
occurring in ΓS to unspent transaction outputs (T, i)
(where T occurs in C).
• txburn is an injective function, mapping the names x
occurring in ΓS only in burn authorizations to off-chain
transactions.
We require the relation to respect the following invariants:
• if txout(x) = (T, i), then for all (T′, j) ∈ T.in, there
exists y such that txout(y) = (T′, j).
• if ΓS = 〈A, v : B〉x | · · · , then there exist T, i such that
txout(x) = (T, i) and:
1) (T, i).arg = pkA
2) (T, i).scr = versig(ctxo.arg, rtx.wit)
3) (T, i).val = v.
• if ΓS = 〈A, v : τ 〉x | · · · with τ 6= B then there exist T, i,
T′, j such that txout(x) = (T, i), tkid(τ ) = (T′, j), and:
1) (T, i).op ∈ 0..5
2) (T, i).tkid = (T′, j)
3) (T, i).owner = A
4) (T, i).tkval = v
5) (T, i).scr = eTOK
6) (T, i).val = 0
Base case: coher (S, C, txout , tkid , txburn) holds if the
following conditions hold:
• S and C are initial, i.e.: S is initial if it contains only
bitcoin deposits, and C only contains from a coinbase
transaction T0;
• txout injectively maps exactly the names x of the de-
posits 〈A, v : B〉x in ΓS to outputs (T0, i) of the form:
1) (T0, i).arg = pkA
2) (T0, i).scr = versig(ctxo.arg, rtx.wit)
3) (T0, i).val = v
• dom (tkid) = ∅
Inductive case 1: coher (Sα, Cγ, txout, tkid , txburn) holds
if coher (S, C, txout ′, tkid ′, txburn′) and one of the following
cases applies:
(1) α = gen(x, v). In ΓS there exists a deposit 〈A, 0 : B〉x
and γ = T, where:
• T.in = txout ′(x)
• T has exactly one output
• (T, 1).op = 0
• (T, 1).tkid = txout ′(x)
• (T, 1).owner = A
• (T, 1).tkval = v
• (T, 1).scr = eTOK
• (T, 1).val = 0
In ΓSα there exists a deposit 〈A, v : τ 〉y which did not
exist in ΓS . The mapping txout inherits all the bindings
of txout ′ except that for x, and extends it with the binding
y 7→ (T, 1). The mapping tkid extends tkid ′ with the
binding τ 7→ txout ′(x). The mapping txburn is equal to
txburn
′
.
(2) α = split(x, v,B). In ΓS there exists a deposit
〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉x and γ = T. The following conditions
hold:
• T.in = txout ′(x)
• T has exactly two outputs (of indices 1 and 2)
• (T, 1).owner = A
• (T, 2).owner = B
Further, if τ = B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 1).scr = (T, 2).scr = eBTC
• (T, 1).val = v
• (T, 2).val = v′
Further, if τ 6= B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 1).op = 2
• (T, 1).tkid = (T, 2).tkid = txout ′(x).tkid
• (T, 1).tkval = v
• (T, 2).tkval = v′
• (T, 1).scr = (T, 2).scr = eTOK
• (T, 1).val = (T, 2).val = 0
In both cases, in ΓSα there exist two deposits 〈A, v : τ 〉y
and 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y′ which did not exist in ΓS . The mapping
txout inherits all the bindings of txout ′ except that for
x, and extends it with the bindings y 7→ (T, 1) and y′ 7→
(T, 2). The mapping tkid is equal to tkid ′. The mapping
txburn is equal to txburn′.
(3) α = join(x, y,C). In ΓS there exist two deposits
〈A, v : τ 〉x and 〈B, v
′ : τ 〉y , and γ = T. The following
conditions hold:
• T has exactly two inputs
v > 0
〈A, 0 : B〉x | Γ
A⊲xgen(x,v)
−−−−−−−−→ 〈A, 0 : B〉x | A ⊲x gen(x, v) | Γ
[AUTHGEN]
x = x1 · · ·xn j ∈ 1..n y fresh (except in burn auth for x) n = 1 ∨ (n ≥ 1 ∧ ∀i : τ i = B)
(
‖ i∈1..n〈Ai, vi : τ i〉xi
)
| Γ
Aj⊲xj
burn(x,y)
−−−−−−−−−−→
(
‖ i∈1..n〈Ai, vi : τ i〉xi
)
| Aj ⊲xj burn(x, y) | Γ
[AUTHBURN]
v, v′ ≥ 0
〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉x | Γ
A⊲xsplit(x,v,B)
−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉x | A ⊲x split(x, v,B) | Γ
[AUTHSPLIT]
(P, z) ∈ {(A, x), (B, y)}
〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y | Γ
P⊲zjoin(x,y,C)
−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y | P ⊲z join(x, y,C) | Γ
[AUTHJOIN]
(P, z) ∈ {(A, x), (B, y)} τ 6= B
〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉y | Γ
P⊲zxchg(x,y)
−−−−−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉x | 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉y | P ⊲z xchg(x, y) | Γ
[AUTHEXCHANGE]
〈A, v : τ 〉x | Γ
A⊲x give(x,B)
−−−−−−−−−→ 〈A, v : τ 〉x | A ⊲x give(x,B) | Γ
[AUTHGIVE]
Fig. 8: Semantics of authorizations.
• T.in(1) = txout ′(x)
• T.in(2) = txout ′(y)
• T has exactly one output
• (T, 1).owner = C
Further, if τ = B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 1).val = v + v′
• (T, 1).scr = eBTC
Further, if τ 6= B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 1).op = 3
• (T, 1).tkid = txout ′(x).tkid = txout ′(y).tkid
• (T, 1).tkval = v + v′
• (T, 1).scr = eTOK
• (T, 1).val = 0
In both cases, in ΓSα there exist one deposit
〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉z which did not exist in ΓS . The map-
ping txout inherits all the bindings of txout ′ except those
for x and y, and extends it with the binding z 7→ (T, 1).
The mapping tkid is equal to tkid ′. The mapping txburn
is equal to txburn′.
(4) α = xchg(x, y). In ΓS there exist two deposits
〈A, v : τ 〉x and 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉y , τ 6= B, and γ = T. The
following conditions hold:
• T has exactly two inputs and two outputs
• T.in(1) = txout ′(x)
• T.in(2) = txout ′(y)
• (T, 1).op = 4
• (T, 1).owner = B
• (T, 2).owner = A
• (T, 1).tkid = txout ′(x).tkid
• (T, 1).tkval = v
• (T, 1).val = 0
• (T, 1).scr = eTOK
Further, if τ ′ = B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 2).val = v′
• (T, 2).scr = eBTC
Further, if τ ′ 6= B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 2).scr = eTOK
• (T, 2).tkval = v′
• (T, 2).tkid = txout ′(y).tkid
• (T, 2).val = 0
In both cases, in ΓSα there exist two deposits
〈A, v′ : τ ′〉x′ and 〈B, v : τ 〉y′ which did not exist in ΓS .
The mapping txout inherits all the bindings of txout ′
except those for x and y, and extends it with the bindings
x′ 7→ (T, 2) and y′ 7→ (T, 1). The mapping tkid is equal
to tkid ′. The mapping txburn is equal to txburn′.
(5) α = give(x,B). In ΓS there exists a deposit 〈A, v : τ 〉x
and γ = T. One of the following subcases must apply:
a) The following conditions hold:
• T.in = txout ′(x)
• T has exactly one output
• (T, 1).owner = B
Further, if τ = B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 1).scr = eBTC
• (T, 1).val = v
Further, if τ 6= B, the following conditions hold:
• (T, 1).op = 5
• (T, 1).tkid = txout ′(x).tkid
• (T, 1).tkval = v
• (T, 1).scr = eTOK
• (T, 1).val = 0
In both cases, in ΓSα there exists a deposit 〈B, v : τ 〉y
which did not exist in ΓS .
b) The following conditions hold:
• T has exactly two inputs and two outputs
• (T, 1).in = txout ′(x)
• (T, 2).in 6∈ ran (txout ′)
• (T, 1).op = 4
1 if not verrec ( ptxo (1)) then // ctxo is a token generator
2 ctxo.op = 0 // gen action
3 and ctxo. tkid = txid( ptxo (1)) // token id
4 and ptxo (1). val = 0 // spent txo has 0 BTC
5 and outlen ( ctxo) = 1 // gen has 1 out
6 and ctxo. tkval > 0 // positive token value
7 else true
8
9 and
10
11 if rtxo .op = 1 then /* ******************* BURN ********************/
12 versig( ctxo. owner ,rtx. wit) // check owner
13 and verscr( false , rtxo (1)) // make rtx unspendable
14 and inlen( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 in
15 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 out
16
17 else if rtxo.op = 2 then /* ******************* SPLIT ********************/
18 versig( ctxo. owner ,rtx. wit) // check owner
19 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // covenants on rtx
20 and verrec ( rtxo (2))
21 and inlen( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 in
22 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 outs
23 and rtxo (1). tkval >= 0 // positive token value
24 and rtxo (2). tkval >= 0
25 and rtxo (1). owner = ctxo. owner // preserve owner
26 and rtxo (1). tkid = ctxo. tkid // preserve tkid
27 and rtxo (2). tkid = ctxo. tkid
28 and rtxo (1). tkval + rtxo (2). tkval = ctxo. tkval // preserve value
29
30 else if rtxo.op = 3 then /* ******************* JOIN ********************/
31 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 in
32 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 out
33 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // coventant on rtx
34 and verrec ( stxo (2)) // covenants on both inputs
35 and verrec ( stxo (1))
36 and ctxo. tkid = rtxo (1).tkid // preserve token id
37 and versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit) // check owner
38 and rtxo (1). tkval = stxo (1). tkval + stxo (2). tkval // preserve value
39
40 else if rtxo.op = 4 then /* ******************* XCHG ********************/
41 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 ins
42 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 2 // rtx has 2 outs
43 and versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit) // check owner
44 and verrec ( stxo (1)) // covenant on input 1
45 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // covenant on rtx(1)
46 and rtxo (1). owner = stxo (2). owner // swap owners
47 and rtxo (2). owner = stxo (1). owner
48 and rtxo (1). tkval = stxo (1). tkval // preserve value
49 and rtxo (1). tkid = stxo (1). tkid // preserve tkid
50 if verrec ( stxo (2)) then /* **** EXCHANGE TOKEN/TOKEN *****/
51 verrec ( rtxo (2)) // covenant on rtx(2)
52 and rtxo (2). tkval = stxo (2). tkval // preserve tkval
53 and rtxo (2). tkid = stxo (2). tkid // preserve tkid
54 else /* **** EXCHANGE TOKEN /BTC *****/
55 verscr( versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit), rtxo (2))
56 and rtxo (2). val = stxo (2). val // preserve BTC
57
58 else if rtxo.op = 5 then /* ******************* GIVE ********************/
59 inlen( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 in
60 and outlen ( rtxo (1)) = 1 // rtx has 1 out
61 and versig( ctxo. owner , rtx. wit) // check owner
62 and verrec ( rtxo (1)) // covenant on rtx(1)
63 and rtxo (1). tkid = ctxo. tkid // preserve tkid
64 and rtxo (1). tkval = ctxo. tkval // preserve value
65
66 else false
Fig. 9: Full token script.
• (T, 1).scr = eTOK
• (T, 1).tkid = txout ′(x).tkid
• (T, 1).owner = T.in(2).owner
• (T, 1).tkval = v
• (T, 1).val = 0
Note: in this case we are using the symbolic give
action to match the appending of a transaction T which
consumes two inputs: the first one is mapped by txout ′
and encodes a user-defined token τ , while the second
one is not mapped by txout ′. So, the computational
action encoded by T is an xchg between τ and some
τ ′ . Appending T actually preserves the token identifier
and its value, just changing its owner.
c) The following conditions hold:
• T has exactly two inputs and two outputs
• (T, 1).in 6∈ ran (txout ′)
• (T, 2).in = txout ′(x)
• (T, 1).op = 4
• (T, 2).scr = eTOK
• (T, 2).tkid = txout ′(x).tkid
• (T, 2).owner = T.in(1).owner
• (T, 2).tkval = v
• (T, 2).val = 0
In all the subcases above, the mapping txout inherits all
the bindings of txout ′ except that for x, and extends it
with the binding y 7→ (T, 1) (in subcases (5)a-(5)b), or
with y 7→ (T, 2) (in subcase (5)c). The mapping tkid is
equal to tkid ′. The mapping txburn is equal to txburn′.
(6) α = burn(x, y). Let x = x1 · · ·xn. In ΓS there exist n
deposits 〈Ai, vi : τ i〉xi , and γ = T = txburn
′(y). One of
the following subcases must apply:
a) τ1 6= B and n = 1. Further:
• T.in = txout ′(x1)
• T has exactly one output
• (T, 1).op = 1
• (T, 1).scr = false
• (T, 1).val = 0
Note: in this case we are using the symbolic burn
action to match the appending of a transaction T which
consumes one input mapped by txout ′, and encodes
a user-defined token. The script of T is set to false ,
actually destroying the token.
b) τ1 = B and τ i = B for all i ∈ 1..n. Further:
• T.in contains at least txout ′(xi) for all i ∈ 1..n, but
it does not contain any other output in ran (txout ′):
{x | txout ′(x) ∈ T.in} = {x1, . . . , xn}
• T does not correspond to any action α discussed
in the items (1)-(5) above.
The mapping txout is equal to txout ′. The mapping tkid
is equal to tkid ′. The mapping txburn inherits all the
bindings in txburn′, except that for y.
(7) α = A ⊲x gen(x, v). In ΓS there exists a deposit
〈A, 0 : B〉x . γ = B → ∗ : m, where m is the signature of
A on a transaction T satisfying the conditions in item (1).
The mappings txout , tkid , txburn are equal to txout ′,
tkid ′, txburn′, respectively.
(8) α = A ⊲x split(x, v,B). In ΓS there exists a deposit
〈A, (v + v′) : τ 〉x . γ = B → ∗ : m, where m is the
signature of A on a transaction T satisfying the conditions
in item (2). The mappings txout , tkid , txburn are equal
to txout ′, tkid ′, txburn′, respectively.
(9) α = P⊲z join(x, y,C), where (P, z) ∈ {(A, x), (B, y)},
for some A and B. In ΓS there exist two deposits
〈A, v : τ 〉x and 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y . γ = B → ∗ : m, where
m is the signature of P on a transaction T satisfying the
conditions in item (3). The mappings txout , tkid , txburn
are equal to txout ′, tkid ′, txburn′, respectively.
(10) α = P ⊲z xchg(x, y), where (P, z) ∈ {(A, x), (B, y)},
for some A and B. In ΓS there exist two deposits
〈A, v : τ 〉x and 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉y , with τ 6= B. γ = B →
∗ : m, where m is the signature of P on a transaction
T satisfying the conditions in item (4). The mappings
txout , tkid , txburn are equal to txout ′, tkid ′, txburn′,
respectively.
(11) α = A ⊲x give(x,B). In ΓS there exists a deposit
〈A, v : τ 〉x . γ = B → ∗ : m, where m is the signature of
A on a transaction T satisfying the conditions in item (5).
The mappings txout , tkid , txburn are equal to txout ′,
tkid
′
, txburn
′
, respectively.
(12) α = Aj ⊲xj burn(x, y). Let x = x1 · · ·xn. In ΓS
there exist n deposits 〈Ai, vi : τ i〉xi . γ = B → ∗ : m,
where m is the signature of Aj on a transaction T
satisfying the conditions in item (6). The mappings txout
and tkid are equal to txout ′ and tkid ′, respectively.
If y ∈ dom (txburn′), then txburn′(y) = T, and
txburn = txburn′. Otherwise, txburn extends txburn′
with the binding y 7→ T.
Inductive case 2: coher (S, Cγ, txout , tkid , txburn) holds
if coher (S, C, txout, tkid , txburn) and one of the following
cases applies:
(1) γ = T, where no input of T belongs to ran txout .
(2) γ = A → ∗ : m, where γ does not correspond to any
symbolic move, according to the inductive case 1.
APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR SECTION VII
Proof of Lemma 3
By induction on S ∼ C. The base case is trivial. Otherwise,
there are the following two cases:
• For inductive case 1 of the definition of coherence, we
have S = S ′α and C = C′γ, with S ′ ∼ C′. There are two
subcases:
– x occurs in S ′: by the induction hypothesis, txout ′(x)
is an output with the intended fields. We therefore only
need to ensure that txout(x) = txout ′(x). Inspecting
how each α is handled in the definition of coherence,
we observe that this always holds except when x no
longer occurs in ΓS . The latter case contradicts the
hypothesis.
– x does not occur in S ′: Inspecting how each α is
handled in the definition of coherence, we observe that
this is only possible when γ = T and txout(x) points
to some output of T which has the intended fields.
• For inductive case 2 of the definition of coherence, we
have S = S ′ and C = C′γ, with S ′ ∼ C′. By the
induction hypothesis, txout ′(x) is an output with the
intended fields. We therefore only need to ensure that
txout(x) = txout ′(x), which holds since in inductive
case 2 txout ′ = txout .
Proof of Lemma 4
By induction on S ∼ C. The base case is trivial, since it
only involves bitcoins. Otherwise, there are the following two
cases:
• For inductive case 1 of the definition of coherence, we
have S = S ′α and C = C′γ, with S ′ ∼ C′. There are two
subcases:
– (T, i) also occurs (unspent) in C′: We now prove the
items of the lemma:
∗ when (T, i).tkid does not correspond to any out-
puts, we apply the induction hypothesis to prove it
is unspendable.
∗ When its tkid corresponds to some mapped output
but (T, i) /∈ ran (txout) (case 1), we also have
(T, i) /∈ ran (txout ′), since otherwise (T, i) would
have been spent by γ (as can be verified inspecting
all the possible cases in the definition of coher-
ence). Hence the induction hypothesis proves it
unspendable.
∗ When instead (T, i) = txout(y) (case 2), we also
have (T, i) = txout ′(y), since otherwise (T, i)
would have been spent by γ (as can be verified
inspecting all the possible cases in the definition
of coherence). The thesis then follows from the
induction hypothesis and the fact that α can not
spend y (otherwise (T, i) would also be spent).
– (T, i) does not occur in C′: We have γ = T. In-
specting how each α is handled in the definition of
coherence, we observe that this case is only possible
when (T, i).tkid is some output in ran (txout), which
belongs to the blockchain. Further, inspecting the same
cases, we observe that (T, i) must also belong to
ran (txout), it is spendable, and that it corresponds to
a suitable symbolic deposit in ΓS .
• For inductive case 2 of the definition of coherence, we
have S = S ′ and C = C′γ, with S ′ ∼ C′. We also have
txout ′ = txout in this case. There are two subcases:
– (T, i) also occurs (unspent) in C′: the thesis imme-
diately follows from the induction hypothesis, which
involves the same S and txout .
– (T, i) does not occur in C′: by the definition of
coherence, this is possible only when γ = T and no
input of T belongs to txout . We now prove the items
of the lemma:
∗ when (T, i).tkid does not correspond to any output,
we want to prove (T, i) is unspendable. Indeed,
the first part of the token script requires either that
(T, i).tkid is the parent output (contradiction) or
that it has the same script and tkid. In the latter
case, by the induction hypothesis, the parent was
unspendable – contradiction.
∗ When (T, i).tkid corresponds to some mapped out-
put but (T, i) /∈ ran (txout) (case 1), we also want
to prove it is unspendable.
Indeed, the first part of the token script requires
either that (T, i).tkid is the parent output or that it
has the same script and tkid. In the former case, by
hypothesis we get that (T, i).tkid (being a parent)
does not belong to ran (txout), so it does not
correspond to any mapped output – contradiction.
In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, the
parent was unspendable – contradiction.
∗ When instead (T, i) = txout(y) (case 2), we want
to prove it is spendable and that it corresponds to
a suitable symbolic deposit. This case is actually
impossible since txout(y) = txout ′(y) is an out-
put which already occurs in C′, contradicting the
hypothesis γ = T.
Proof of Theorem 5 (Computational soundness)
Assume that C satisfies the hypotheses, but there does
not exist any S which is coherent to C and conforming to
the symbolic strategies. Consider the longest prefix C′ of C
such that there exists some S ′ which is coherent (to C′) and
conforming (to the computational strategies). We have that
C = C′γ C′′. We now show that either C′γ has a corresponding
symbolic run S ′S ′′ which is coherent and conforming to the
symbolic strategies (contradicting the maximality of C′), or the
adversary succeeded in a signature forgery (which can happen
only with negligible probability). We proceed by cases on γ:
Case 1 — γ is a broadcast message: Let γ = A → ∗ : m.
Then, either one of the items (7) to (12) of the inductive case 1
applies, or the inductive case 2 applies (since, by construction,
the inductive case 2 catches all the other cases). In any case,
we find a coherent extension S ′′ (possibly empty). Further,
S ′S ′′ conforms to the symbolic strategies: (i) if the inductive
case 2 was applied, then S ′′ is empty, and so conformance
follows from the induction hypothesis; (ii) if the inductive case
1 was applied, then the broadcast message m is a signature
of some user B. If B is dishonest, then Adv can compute the
signature: then, there exists a symbolic strategy of Adv which
performs such move, and the resulting run conforms to the
users’ symbolic strategies. If B is honest, either the signature
was forged by Adv (but only with a negligible probability), or
produced by B’s computational strategy. In the latter case,
since the computational strategy of B is derived from the
symbolic one, B’s symbolic strategy outputs an authorization
of B, which is exactly the label contained in S ′′. Therefore,
S ′S ′′ conforms to the symbolic strategies.
Case 2 — γ is a transaction: Let γ = T. We consider the
following subcases, according to the inputs of T:
• if none of the inputs of T belongs to ran (txout), then
we achieve coherence and conformance with S ′′ empty.
• otherwise, if all the inputs of T in ran (txout) correspond
to symbolic B deposits, there are two subcases:
– T is obtained by one of the items from (1), (2), (3)
or (5) of the inductive case 1 of coherence. Note that,
by requirement (ii) of the definition of computational
strategies, then all the witnesses in T must have
been broadcast in a previous computational step: by
coherence, the corresponding authorizations have been
performed in the symbolic run. Then, we can choose
for S ′′ the symbolic action corresponding to T, which
makes S ′′ a coherent extension of S ′. Conformance
holds trivially, by choosing Adv’s symbolic strategy to
perform the symbolic action corresponding to T.
– T is obtained by the item (6) of the inductive case 1 of
coherence (by construction, this catches all the other
cases). The proof proceeds as in the previous case.
• otherwise, there exists at least one input of T in
ran (txout) corresponding to a deposit of a user-defined
token, say 〈A, v : τ 〉x . Let (T′, i) = txout(x): since
this output stores a user-defined token, then it must be
(T′, i).scr = eTOK . Since T spends (T
′, i), then eTOK
evaluates to true. We proceed by cases on (T, 1).op:
– op = 1. In this case appending T corresponds to
performing a burn action. The script eTOK in (T
′, i)
ensures that T has only one input, i.e. (T′, i), and
one outputs. Since eTOK requires the signature of
(T′, i).owner, and since by requirement (ii) of the
definition of computational strategies, all the witnesses
in T must have been broadcast in a previous compu-
tational step, by coherence, it follows that the corre-
sponding authorization (with a fresh name y) has been
performed in the symbolic run. Let S ′′ = burn(x, y).
Then S ′′ is a valid extension of S ′, since the precon-
ditions of rule [BURN] are respected. Further, S ′S ′′ is
coherent with C′γ by the item (6) of the inductive
case 1 of coherence. Conformance holds trivially, by
choosing Adv’s symbolic strategy to perform the sym-
bolic action corresponding to T (this also applies to all
subcases below).
– op = 2. In this case appending T corresponds to
performing a split action. The script eTOK in (T
′, i)
ensures that:
1) T has only one input, i.e. (T′, i), and two outputs.
Let v1 = (T, 1).tkval, let v2 = (T, 2).tkval, and
let B = (T, 2).owner;
2) (T, 1).scr = eTOK ;
3) v1, v2 ≥ 0, and v1 + v2 = v.
Since eTOK requires the signature of (T
′, i).owner =
A, and since by requirement (ii) of the definition of
computational strategies, all the witnesses in T must
have been broadcast in a previous computational step,
by coherence, it follows that the corresponding autho-
rization has been performed in the symbolic run. Let
S ′′ = split(x, v1,B). Then S ′′ is a valid extension of
S ′, since the preconditions of rule [SPLIT] are respected.
Further, S ′S ′′ is coherent with C′γ by the item (2) of
the inductive case 1 of coherence.
– op = 3. The script eTOK in (T
′, i) ensures that:
1) T has two inputs and one output: let (T′′, j) be the
other input, sibling of (T′, i);
2) (T, 1).scr = (T′′, j).scr = eTOK ;
3) (T′, i).tkid = (T, 1).tkid = (T′′, j).tkid.
There are two further subcases, according to whether
(T′′, j) ∈ ran (txout) or not:
∗ if (T′′, j) ∈ ran (txout), then this input corre-
sponds to a deposit 〈B, v′ : τ 〉y , and appending T
corresponds to performing a join action. By item
3 above, both x and y store the same token τ .
Since the script in (T′, i) requires the signature
of A, and that in (T′′, j) requires the signature of
B, and since by requirement (ii) of the definition
of computational strategies, all the witnesses in
T must have been broadcast in a previous com-
putational step, by coherence, it follows that the
corresponding authorizations have been performed
in the symbolic run. Let C = (T, 1).owner. Let
S ′′ = join(x, y,C). Then S ′′ is a valid extension
of S ′, since the preconditions of rule [JOIN] are
respected. Further, S ′S ′′ is coherent with C′γ by
the item (3) of the inductive case 1 of coherence.
∗ if (T′′, j) 6∈ ran (txout), then by the first item
of Lemma 4, the output (T′′, j) is unspendable —
contradiction. Then, this case does not apply.
– op = 4. The script eTOK in (T
′, i) ensures that:
1) T has two inputs and two outputs: let (T′′, j) be
the other input, sibling of (T′, i);
2) (T, 1).scr = eTOK ;
There are two further subcases:
∗ if (T′′, j) 6∈ ran (txout), then appending T corre-
sponds to performing a give action. Since the script
in (T′, i) requires the signature of A, and since by
requirement (ii) of the definition of computational
strategies, all the witnesses in T must have been
broadcast in a previous computational step, by
coherence, it follows that the corresponding autho-
rization has been performed in the symbolic run.
Let B = (T′′, j).owner, and let S ′′ = give(x,B).
Then S ′′ is a valid extension of S ′, since the
preconditions of rule [GIVE] are respected. There
are two subcases. If (T′′, j) = T.in(1), then
S ′S ′′ is coherent with C′γ by the item (5)c of
the inductive case 1 of coherence. Otherwise, if
(T′′, j) = T.in(2) we obtain coherence by the item
(5)b of the inductive case 1 of coherence.
∗ otherwise, if (T′′, j) ∈ ran (txout), then this input
corresponds to a deposit 〈B, v′ : τ ′〉y . Appending
T corresponds to performing an xchg action. Since
the script in (T′, i) requires the signature of A, and
that in (T′′, j) requires the signature of B, and since
by requirement (ii) of the definition of computa-
tional strategies, all the witnesses in T must have
been broadcast in a previous computational step,
by coherence, it follows that the corresponding
authorizations have been performed in the symbolic
run. There are two further subcases:
· τ ′ = B. Then, it must be (T′, i) = T.in(1) and
(T′′, j) = T.in(2). Let S ′′ = xchg(x, y).
· if τ ′ 6= B. If (T′, i) = T.in(1) and (T′′, j) =
T.in(2) then let S ′′ = xchg(x, y), otherwise let
S ′′ = xchg(y, x).
Then, S ′S ′′ is coherent with C′γ by the item (4)
of the inductive case 1 of coherence.
– op = 5. In this case appending T corresponds to
performing a give action. The script eTOK in (T
′, i)
ensures that:
1) T has only one input, i.e. (T′, i), and one output;
2) (T, 1).scr = eTOK ;
3) (T, 1).tkval = (T′, i).tkval;
4) (T, 1).tkid = (T′, i).tkid.
Since eTOK requires the signature of (T
′, i).owner =
A, and since by requirement (ii) of the definition
of computational strategies, all the witnesses in T
must have been broadcast in a previous computational
step, by coherence, it follows that the corresponding
authorization has been performed in the symbolic run.
Let S ′′ = give(x,B). Then S ′′ is a valid extension of
S ′, since the preconditions of rule [GIVE] are respected.
Further, S ′S ′′ is coherent with C′γ by the item (5)a of
the inductive case 1 of coherence.
